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Introductory Remarks
I would like to thank your faculty and Kansai University
for so generously sponsoring my visit here. Professors Yamanka
and Imanishi are responsible for my coming to Kansai in the first
place. Professors Kobo and Takeshita arranged for my addresses
today. Professors Takigawa and Yamanka have literally taken me
by the hand to assure that I find my way about Japan. All of you
have been terrific hosts. I am having a very productive and happy
visit. Nothing is lacking. I only hope someday to return your
kindness.
I would like to note, too, that Professor Yamanaka and I
met in Munich over twenty years ago when we were both fellows
of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. The spirit of the
Humboldt Foundation is behind this talk today.
1.

Introduction

This must be an exiting time to be a law professor in Japan!
According to national policy “greatly increasing the legal population is an urgent task.”1 A new legal training system is being es*Visiting Scholar, Kansai University Faculty of Law; Visiting Associate Professor
of Law, The Catholic University of America (Spring Term 2003); Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City (2003-2004). J.D. (Cornell), LL.M. (Georgetown), Dr. jur. (Munich). The author can be reached at
jmaxeiner@ubalt.edu.
1 Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, June 12,
2001, Chap. III, Part 1, 1.
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tablished and at its “core” are to be the new law schools.2 Within
fifteen years, the legal population is to increase by 150% or more—
from about 20,000 now to 50,000 or more lawyers, judges and
prosecutors in 2018.3 You are needed. And there is nothing better
for one’s self-confidence than to be needed.
This rapid increase in the number of lawyers means that in
only a few years, lawyers trained under the new system will account for the majority of all lawyers in Japan. Your country has
quite literally charged you with the task of building the legal profession.
This is such an exciting development for legal education
that even a foreign visitor such as myself cannot resist commenting on it. I realize that I know no Japanese and have little knowledge of Japanese law and history. Yet I request your indulgence
and ask that you allow me—as an outsider—to comment on these
developments. Much of what I have to say may be obvious to you.
But I hope that I may either bring to you new insights or perhaps
just confirm for you conclusions that you have already reached.
My perspective as an outsider is somewhat different from
that of other outsiders in two respects. I am reasonably familiar
not only with my own legal system, the American, but also with
the other foreign legal system most closely flowed in Japan, the
German. Moreover, my perspective is not only that of a scholar,
but also that of a practitioner who has been active in international
practice. In fact, I have spent more time as a practitioner than as a
scholar. My practice career has spanned three principal areas of
practice, as a government lawyer for the United States Department of Justice, as a private lawyer for international law firms in
New York City, and as in house Associate General Counsel of a
major American corporation.
2.

My thesis summarized
Here in summary is my thesis today:
a. The Rule of Law is at the heart of the present legal reform.

Id. at Chap. III, Part 1.
Id. at Chap. III, Part 1, 1. In this talk I refer to all three branches of the profession as „lawyers.“
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b. There is an international consensus about basic elements of
the Rule of Law.
c. Legal methods are central to the Rule of Law. But different
legal methods are used to realize the Rule of Law.
d. Teaching legal methods, i.e., teaching to think like a lawyer, is at the heart of that which is professional in legal
education.
e. The present legal reform invites you to teach legal methods. It is my opinion, as an outsider, that you should seize
the opportunity to do that—even more than before—and
you should work actively to develop the future Rule of
Law in Japan.
I intend to address these points sequentially. In some instances, I will draw upon examples from Germany and the United
States and discuss my imperfect understanding of Japanese law.
3.

The Rule of Law is at the heart of the present legal reform

The Rule of Law is at the heart of the pending legal reform.
The Justice System Reform Council Report could hardly be clearer
on this point. Chapter I states:
… [T]his Council has determined that the fundamental task for reform of the justice system is to define clearly “what we must do to transform both the
spirit of the law and the rule of law into the flesh
and blood of this country, so that they become ‘the
shape of our country.” …4
The theme of the Rule of Law runs like a leitmotif through the entire Report. The Report notes that the Rule of Law is an “essential
base” for converting from an advance control system to an “afterthe-fact review/remedy type society” 5 that permits each and
4 Id. Chapter I. (Further in Chapter I: “This reform of the justice system aims to
tie these various reforms together organically under “the rule of law” that is one
of the fundamental concepts on which the Constitution is based. Justice system
reform should be positioned as the “final linchpin” of a serious of various reforms concerning restructuring of “the shape of our country.”)
5 Id. Chap. I, Part 3, 3.
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every person to “break out of the consciousness of being a governed object and [to] become a governing subject, with autonomy
and bearing social responsibility …”6
4.

International consensus on some basic elements of the
Rule of Law

The Rule of Law is central to the legal systems of Japan,
Germany and the United States. In Germany it is referred to as the
Rechtsstaatprinzip, but the two concepts are substantially the
same.7 There is an international consensus as to some of the basic
requirements of the Rule of Law: law should be clear. It should be
publicly promulgated and prospective. Law should be stable. A
mechanism for its implementation should permit a predictable
decision in the individual case. Law must be capable of guiding
those subject to it, and, for law to be capable of guiding the subject, it must also protect the individual from arbitrary use of
power to make and apply law. When the Rule of Law is safeguarded, the subject can rely on the law and can foresee application of state power.8
The Rule of Law is not an absolute value. Its demands all
too soon conflict with the ability to generalize in rules. Gustav
Radbruch observed the tension: “Legal security requires positive
law, but positive law demands application without regard to its
justice and utility.”9 At times the Rule of Law gives way to other
interests, namely to justice or utility (i.e., general welfare). Examples are the use of general clauses and of retrospective legislaId. Chap. I.
Neil MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die rule of law, Juristenzeitung 1984, 65;
Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty 9 (1999); Erhard Denninger, “Rechtsstaat” oder “Rule of law” – was ist das heute?, in Festschrift fuer K. Luederssen
(2001)..
8 See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law chap. 2 (2nd ed. 1969); Gustav Radbruch,
Rechtsphilosophie § 9 (8th ed. 1973); Ken Takeshita, The Modernization of the Japanese Legal System, 19 Kansai University Review of Law and Politics 1, 8-9 (1998);
Keiichi Yamanaka, Staatsraison versus Rechtsstaat. Zur verfassungshistorischen Bedeutung der Otsu-Affaere, 29 Verfassung und Recht in Uebersee 215 (1996); Swiss
Constitution of 18 April 1999, Art. 5 (“Grundlage und Schranke staatlichen Handelns ist das Recht.”)
9 Radbruch, op. cit. at 166.
6
7

5
The Rule of Law in the Reform of Legal Education:
Teaching the Legal Mind in Japanese Law Schools

tion.10 Different legal systems have different ways to permit this
needed flexibility. But if that flexibility becomes to great, the Rule
of Law is at risk.
5.

Legal methods are central to the Rule of Law

The Rule of Law is concerned with how the law is actually
applied, that is, with legal methods. What is a legal method? It is a
way to reach a substantive decision of a legal question.11 Legal
methods bring law and facts together to govern a concrete case.
Legal methods are concerned with two principal aspects of law:
how law is stated and the mechanisms by which law is applied.12
In the United States one speaks of rules and of courts or judicial
process. In Germany, one speaks of Orientierungs- and of Realisierungssicherheit. I suspect that similar distinctions are made here
in Japan.
Most lawyers have only a vague idea of differences in legal
methods.13 Legal methods are rarely taught comparatively. One
learns one’s own legal method when one learns to “think like a
lawyer”. The idea of the “legal mind” is found around the world,
but it does not mean the same thing everywhere. Lawyers work
with their own legal methods without thinking about them.14
See James R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Antitrust Law: A Comparative Study 12-13 (1986); James Maxeiner, Rechtspolitik und
Methoden im deutschen und amerikanischen Kartellrecht: eine vergleichende
Betrachtung Kap. 2 (1986).
11 See 1 Fikentscher, Die Methoden des Rechts in vergleichender Darstellung xix
(1975-1977), 4 id. 121; James R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods, op. cit.; Gutram
Rahn, Rechtsdenken und Rechtsauffassung in Japan dargestellt an der Entwicklung der modernischen japanischen Zivilrechtsmethodik 3 (1990).
12 Cf. John Owen Haley, Authority Without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox 5 (1994) (“By definition, all legal systems, Japan’s included, comprise two
primary elements—norms and sanctions—and the related institutions for making and enforcing legal rules.”)
13 Elsewhere I have sought to increase awareness of foreign legal methods. See
James R. Maxeiner, U.S. “methods awareness” for German Jurists, in Bernhard
Grossfeld et. al, (eds.), Festschrift fuer Wolfgang Fikentscher 114 (1998); Legal
Methods Awareness and Japan in an Era of Global Electronic Commerce, An Address
to the Faculty of Law of the Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan, June 19, 2003.
14 See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Praejudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in Amerika
2 (1933), translated as The Case Law System in America 2 (M. Ansaldi transl.
1989) (“Handling precedents is a matter of tradecraft, an art one learns from ex10
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Legal systems of different countries use different legal
methods to realize the Rule of Law. Some systems place comparatively more emphasis on the role of rules while others place comparatively more emphasis on the role of courts. Some are more
willing to allow the Rule of Law to give way for individual justice,
while others are more likely to allow departures from the Rule of
Law for interests of the general welfare. These differences are apparent in a cursory examination of legal methods in Germany, the
United States and Japan:
a.

German Legal Methods

The classic subsumption model is at the heart of German
legal methods.15 In the German model, law is a system of rules. In
German understanding jurisprudence is a “science of norms.”16
The legal rules are part of an abstract legal order that governs all
behavior. The legal order is a structure of ought-norms. The idea
of their message is not to describe facts, but to prescribe conduct.17
This objective order is contrasted to subjective rights of individual
subjects. A rule of law takes the form of a statement. Hence it is
called, in German, a Rechtssatz (i.e., “law-sentence”). A complete
legal norm consists of two parts: a Tatbestand and a legal consequence (Rechtsfolge). The Tatbestand is an abstract description of a
particular situation. The legal norm takes the form: whenever the
Tatbestand (T) is realized in a concrete factual situation, then a certain legal consequence (R) applies. This is the major premise. The
minor premise is that this particular factual situation S fulfills the
requirements of the Tatbestand T, that is, it is a case of T. The conclusion then logically follows that for the factual situation S, legal
consequence R applies.
In Germany judges apply law to facts. They learn the skill
of drafting a judgment, the so-called “relationship” or “judgment
technique” (Relationstechnik or Urteilstechnik). Foreign jurists learnperience. … One learns this from study, from the practice of law, in general from
life as a lawyer. But little thought is given to what one is learning.”).
15 Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 150 (5th ed., 1983).
16 Id. at 187.
17 Reinhold Zippellius, Einfuehrung in die juristische Methodenlehre 12 (3d ed.,
1980).
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ing German law are advised: “A German judgment is supposed to
appear as an act of an impartial as well as impersonal public
authority furnishing the official and objective interpretation rather
than being based on the personal opinions of the deciding justices.
… The typical German judgment strives after the ideal of deductive reasoning.” 18 The two principal substantive parts of the
judgment are the Tatbestand and the Entscheidungsgründe. The Tatbestand, as it appears in a judgment, is a short statement of the parties’ legal claims and assertions of fact.19 From the Tatbestand, it
should be possible to determine quickly who is seeking what,
from whom, on what ground and to determine which matters are
in dispute and which are not. 20 The Entscheidungsgründe is a
summary of the considerations for the decision.21 It is to evaluate
and subsume the concrete facts of the Tatbestand under the abstract elements of the applicable norm.22
The highly-stylized German judgment is designed to assure that the parties understand the grounds for the court’s decision.23 Ideally the judgment will convince the party losing the
lawsuit that that loss is the correct outcome.24 At a minimum, the
judgment should persuade the loser that the process was rational.
The party affected by the judgment should be enabled to rationally reproduce the grounds for the decision. He should recognize,
that not arbitrariness, but rational argumentation determined the
judgment.25 In this way the parties are guaranteed the constitutional right to equal treatment under the law (Article 3) and the
constitutional right to be heard (rechtliches Gehör, Article 103(1)).26
The judgment also controls the judges.27 If judges fail to subsume
18 Reinhard Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in Werner
Ebke & Matthew Finkin (eds.), Introduction to German Law 1, 21 (1996).
19 ZPO [Zivilprozessordnung] § 313 II; Egon Schneider, Der Zivilrechtsfall in
Pruefung und Praxis 186 (6th ed., 1974).
20 Schneider, op. cit. at 185.
21 ZPO § 313 III.
22 Guenther Schmitz et al. (eds.), Die Station in Zivilsachen 90 (1986).
23 Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann, Zivilprozessordnung § 313, margin no. 33 (53d ed., 1995).
24 Kurt .Schellhammer, Die Arbeitsmethode des Zivilichters 241 (7th ed., 1984).
25 Peter Raisch, Juristische Methoden vom antiken Rom bis zur Gegenwart 121
(1995).
26 Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann ZPO § 313, margin no. 33.
27 Schellhammer, op. cit. at 242; Schmitz et al. op. cit. at 83.
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the facts of the case under the applicable law properly, their decision is subject to correction on appeal. The judgment demonstrates whether the judges understood the losing party’s position;
through its impersonal and colorless nature, it demonstrates the
judges’ neutrality.28
b.

American Legal Methods

The American legal system emphasizes the judicial process
more than rules. While the German legal system is expected to
provide an objectively correct legal answer, the American legal
system is expected to provide procedures to resolve disputes
about what subjective rights are. The focus of American legal
methods is dispute resolution. The concept of legal order in the
German sense of an abstract order that governs all behavior has
disappeared.29
Rule skepticism dominates American legal thinking and
legal instruction. A half century ago, Professor and later U.S. Attorney General Edward Levi in the classic work on legal method
in the United States, denied that the subsumption model applies
in America: “[I]t cannot be said that the legal process is the application of known rules to diverse facts.”30 Much of American legal
theory is concerned with upholding departures from rules. One
characteristic of the American legal system is said to be the “open
modification of the rule to allow purposes or policies to be taken
into account.” 31 A foreign observer, my German Doktorvater
Wolfgang Fikentscher, has noted the positive side of this approach
to rules: “The program is not rule antagonism, but flexibility of
rules and adaptability of the system in order to meet … the need
Schneider, op. cit. at 178-79.
See James R. Maxeiner, U.S. “methods awareness” op cit.
30 Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning at 3 (1949).
31 P.S. Attiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American
Law 91 (1987). Roscoe Pound advocated an “equitable application of the law”
which conceived of the legal rule “as a general guide to the judge, leading him
toward the just result, but insist[ing] that within wide limits he should be free to
deal with the individual case, so as to meet the demands of justice between the
parties and accord with the general reason of ordinary men.” The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence III, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 515 (1912).
28
29
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of the hour.”32 There are many areas in American law where there
are “legitimate departures from rules,” e.g., “jury nullification”
(where juries are permitted to decide against the law) and “prosecutorial discretion” (where prosecutors are permitted to decide
when to enforce laws).33 American legal scholars see these departures from rules as virtues that permit decision makers to take into
account individual circumstances that would be insufficiently appreciated by rule-bound decisions.34
The American legal system places such great weight on
values related to the fairness of the process. It is especially concerned that the parties have notice of all proceedings; that the
judge and the jury are completely neutral and unprejudiced; that
no proceedings take place without all parties’ having the opportunity to be involved; and above all, that each party has a full, fair
and ample opportunity to present “its case”, i.e., its version of the
whole matter. These factors legitimate the proceeding. Appellate
review is concerned with whether the rules were followed and not
with the actual factual findings. The system is designed to assure
the fairness of the process more than the correctness of the result.35
c.

Japanese Legal Methods

The form of Japanese legal methods is close to German
methods. Reading Japanese scholars on Japanese civil procedure
and legal methods, one might assume that there is a very close
2 Fikentscher, op. cit. at 465.
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 148, 153 (1996).
34 See, e.g., Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, Discretion to Disobey: A
Study of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules (1973); Sunstein, op. cit., substantially incorporating Cass .R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953
(1995) (“One of my principal goals in this Article is to respond to a pervasive
social phenomenon: extravagant enthusiasm for rules and an extravagantly rulebound conception of the rule of law.”); F. Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 633, 634 (1995) (“at times it is better not to give reasons than to give them”);
Guido. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes at 180 (1982) (“One
should recognize openly that courts are exercising the power to allocate legislative inertia and to decide whether statutes deserve a retentionist or a revisionist
bias.”).
35 See, e.g., Schlesinger/Bradley, CBS Reports: Enter the Jury Room, first broadcast April 16, 1997 (transcript and video tape available) (“If the American jury
system promises anything, it is not a fair outcome, only a fair process.”)
32
33
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congruence.36 Much as in Germany, judges are trained in a technique of writing judgments to apply law to facts.
A German scholar, Gutram Rahn, however takes issue
with this view. In his Rechtsdenken und Rechtsauffasung in Japan
Dargestellt an der Entwicklung der modernen japanischen Zivilrechtsmethodik (1990) Rahn concludes that Japanese jurists have rejected
the German legal-subsumption method.37 In its place, he says,
there is a method that is distinctly Japanese. Rahn’s fundamental
contention is that a legal judgment in Japanese understanding
consists of two separate and independent acts. There is first an act
of decision (Entscheidungsakt); it consists of a value judgment of all
competing interests. Only after reaching that decision is the court
then to justify that decision in its judgment in a separate act of justification (Entscheidunsbegruendung). Unclear according to Rahn is
the extent to which the court in justifying its decision is to explain
and support its initial value judgment, who should win.38 The
court’s value judgment, according to Rahn,39 is not to be an arbitrary decision. The judge is to weigh the interests of the parties to
the law suit and of other parties interested to reach the correct
conclusion. The written law is, in this decision, only one aspect of
the harmony that is to be sought. The decision must not contradict
the general understanding of the people (gesunden Menschenver36 See, e.g., Muneo Nakamura, My Theory about Judgment, first published in 1965,
and A Comparative Study of Judicial Process, first published in 1958, both reprinted
in Hideo Nakamura (ed.), Muneo Nakamura, Collected Works on Civil Procedure (1994); Hideo Nakamura, Die japanische ZPO in deutscher Sprache Mit
einer Einfuehrung in das japanische Zivilprozessrecht (1978).
37 Gutram Rahm, op cit. at 2.
38 Id. at 327 („Die moderne japanische Zivilrechtsmethodik umfasst zwei voneinander unabhaengige Verfahrensschritte: den Entscheidungsakt und die Entscheidungsbegruendung. Die Entscheidung selbst wird durch ein Werturteil
getroffen dem eine Abwaegung aller vom Rechtsstreit beruehrten Interessen
vorangeht. Das Gesetz ist dabei nur ein unverbindliches Kriterium neben anderen. Entscheidend kommt es darauf an, dass das Werturteil dem gesunden Menschen verstand des japanischen Volkes entspricht. Im zweiten Verfahrensschritt
wird die bereits getroffene Entscheidung als Mittel der Ueberzeugung aufgrund
des Gesetzes juristisch konstruiert. Unklar bleibt, in welchem Unfang die ‚substantiellen’ Entscheidungsgruende—Interessenabwaegung und Werturteil—
offenzulegen sind. Die Forderung nach Offenlegung wird im Prinzip erhoben,
aber dem Ueberzeugungszweck der Begruendung untergeordnet.“)
39 Id. at 366.
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stand des Laien—shiroto no joshiki—素人の常識). 40 Whether the
court is to lay open this value judgment explicitly is debated.41
Other German scholars that are familiar with Japan agree
with Rahn.42 An American, who presumably is not familiar with
German legal methods, also supports Rahn’s thesis. Carl F.
Goodman is his new book, The Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis, observes that frequently in Japanese law, “what
you see is not what you get.” According to Goodman, Japanese
judges are to decide in “a way that is satisfactory to the Japanese
public—in a manner consistent with cultural values, myths (if
need be), and societal norms that may be different from norms
that exist in the United States. … To be consistent with these values, a decision may not reflect a syllogistic analysis of abstract
logic. A decision must take account of the circumstances in
which the parties presently find themselves and legal rules must
be pliable to reflect the context in which the parties and the rule
exist.”43
Id. at 327.
Id. at 345.
42 See, e.g., Axel Schwarz, Vom Wert des Lebens und der Normen, in Heinrich
Menkhaus (ed.), Das Japanische im japanischen Recht 63, 76-77 (1994) („Die Betrachtung zum Zivilrecht: Allgemeiner Teil und Schuldrecht bestaetigt den Befund Gutram Rahns zur Methode der japanischen Rechtspraxis: Die Rechtsanwendung wird nicht durch die Wertung des Gesetzeswortlauts, sondern durch
das Werturteil des Richters determiniert. Entscheidungsfindung und Rechtrfertigung der Entscheidung fallen auseinander. Ein richterliches Beduerfniss, eine
Entscheidung juristisch unter Berufung auf eine Vorschrift sozusagen zu untermauern, scheint nicht zu geben.“)
43 Carl S. Goodman, The Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis 2, 4
(2003) (“But to Japanese judges, whose experience is fundamentally different
from the American experience, the discretion is to be exercised in a way that is
satisfactory to the Japanese public—in a manner consistent with cultural values,
myths (if need be), and societal norms that may be different from norms that
exist in the United States. To be consistent with these values, a decision may not
reflect a syllogistic analysis of abstract logic. A decision must take account of the
circumstances in which the parties presently find themselves and legal rules
must be pliable to reflect the context in which the parties and the rule exist.” Further, “ …. [J]udges are now being asked to interpret laws, Codes and Constitutions written by other societies with other values and, in a sense forced on Japanese society. When these Codes, Constitutions and laws are deemed to conflict
with fundamental Japanese values or with Japanese historic norms or with myths
accepted by the Japanese it is natural for judges to read these laws in a way
which is consistent with these norms, values and myths. More is involved here
40
41
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Among your colleagues I have found little support, either
in theory or practice, for Rahn’s thesis. Most Japanese jurists
with whom I have spoken insist that Japanese judges are bound
by the law and do not feel compelled first to make separate extra-legal value decisions. They tell me that the national Legal
Training and Research Institute does not teach that judges are
first to evaluate the overall merits of the case outside the law, but
teaches judgment techniques similar to German techniques. 44
They inform me that in their classes they do not teach rule skepticism, but rules that they teach are binding.
A couple of your colleagues, however, have granted that
Rahn’s thesis just possibly might have some merit in civil procedure. They have hastened to add that it has no application to
criminal procedure, which is subject to the strict rule of nulla
crime sine lege. And while I have yet to find a Japanese scholar
who has published a direct response in English or German to
Rahn,45 I have found some publications by Japanese scholars in
European languages that do tend to support Rahn’s conclusions.
Among them is one by my gracious host, Professor Yamanaka.
In an article on the origins of the Rule of Law in Japan in the
Otsu Affair of the 19th century, he reports that in Japan there is a
widely held view that statutory law is only a façade ripe for in-

than a strained interpretation of words. If need be a wholesale re-writing of the
law by the judge may be called for and written provisions of the law will be sacrificed for the ‘greater Japanese’ good.”)
44 Cf. Akira Ishikawa, Training, Appointment and Number of Judges, in Gottfried Baumgaertel, Grundprobleme des Zivilprozessrechts Band 2 (Japanisches
Recht Band 19) 3-5 (1985) (describing the training received by judges); Jun’ichi
Murakami, Argumentation und Abwaegung, in Heinrich Menkhaus (ed.), op. cit., at
89, 90 (criticicizing the Rahn thesis: „Liegt die Absicht der ‚Strukturierenden
Rechtslehre’ darin, die Erzeugung der Rechtsnorm als ‚rechtsstaatlich rueckgebundenen Prozess’ zu begreifen, so waere sie in der japanischen Rechtspraxis
nicht liecht zu verwirklichen, in der nach Schwarz ‚gesunder Menschenverstand’
und ‚ausserrechtliche Argumente’ eine entscheidene Rolle spielen. Im Gestalt des
japanischen Richters einen ‚Rechtsbearbeiter’ im Sinne der ‚Strukturierenden
Rechtslehre’ zu finden, waere dann ohne Zweifel unmoeglich. Der Richter wuerde vielmehr stets im normgeloesten Raum bewegen, den die ‚Strukturierende
Rechtslehre’ moeglichst begrenzen will.“).
45 The closest comment in that direction I have found is that of Jur’ichi Murakami, op. cit.
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terpretation.46 Takeyoshi Kawashima of the University of Tokyo
in an address in the United States was more directly supportive
of Rahn’s analysis of Japanese legal methods. He told Americans
that: “ In Japan it is understood from the beginning of a legal enactment that the meaning of law is changeable and not definite.
This appears to be a peculiarly Japanese characteristic of legal
thinking.”47 Kawashima made a very interesting criticism: “this
semantic tradition is Japan is really contradictory to the basic
values which are required for a modern, democratic society
which needs predictable judicial decisions. Sooner or later we
will have to change our traditional attitude toward the meaning
of words, especially in our laws.”
Over and over again in its Report the Justice System Reform Council stresses the need for “predictable, highly clear and
fair rules.”48 I think it is fair for me to ask you, does that not
mean that the Commission has accepted the view of Kawashima
that Japan should change its traditional attitude toward words in
statutes? Does it not suggest that there might just be something
to the argument of Rahn and Goodman? I express no view on the
merits of Japanese legal methods—I still know too little about
them—certainly the criticisms of Rahn and Goodman, which are
not casual, but carefully worked through, suggest that there is
need for Japanese jurists better to explain their methods to foreigners. And that is a need generally recognized in Report, when
the Commission identifies as one reason for reform is its concern
that Japan “occupy an ‘honored place in international society’
(the Preamble to the Constitution)”.49
6.

Teaching legal methods is at the heart of the professional
in legal education

46 Keiichi Yamanaka, op. cit. at 235 (“In Japan herrscht immer noch die Vorstellung, dass das Gesetz fuer die Auslegung nur eine Fassade bilde. An sich sei das
Gesetz nur unnuetzer Schmuck, es lebe erst in der Handhabung durch den Menschen.“).
47 Takeyoshi Kawashima, Japanese Way of Legal Thinking, International Journal of
Law Libraries 127, 131(1979). Cf. Rahn, op. cit. at 18, 352.
48 Justice System Reform Council, op. cit. at Chap. I, Part 2, 1.
49 Justice System Reform Council, op. cit. at Chap. I, Part 1.
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This brief sketch of legal methods shows that legal methods are different in different countries that all embrace the Rule of
Law. Elsewhere I have addressed at length, that even though legal
methods are quite different in Germany and the United States, yet
in both countries the teaching of those methods is at the heart of
what is professional in legal education. 50 The lawyer’s craft is
bringing law and facts together. Learning that skill is one aspect of
legal education that many students find most exciting.
a.

Education of lawyers in Germany
I
n Germany, the system of legal education was established
to train civil servants for the State.51 All persons who wish to become legal professionals, whether as lawyers or as judges or otherwise, are trained as judges. The image of the judge colors the
ideal of the legal professional. In Germany a person who wishes to
become a lawyer must study for a minimum of seven to nine semesters at a German law faculty and then may take the first state
exam. Those students that do so successfully—and most do—are
admitted to a two-year period of practical training sponsored by
the courts of the various German states.
In Germany law students learn the substance of the law at
the university. In their university studies students take courses in
perspective, core and specialist knowledge. In the subsequent
practical training period prospective lawyers learn practical skills.
They learn the Relationstechnik of relating facts to law and of crafting judgments. Judges as classroom teachers didactically teach
classes that lay out the fundamentals of this technique, while individual judges, at least in theory, tutor the aspiring legal professionals, the Referendare or interns, as apprentice judges. The interns learn how to take the substance of the law they learned at
the university, how to conduct legal proceedings to determine
facts, and how to justify in legal judgments their correct determiThe Professional in Legal Education: Foreign Perspectives, An Address to the Faculty of Law of the Himeji Dokkyo-University, Himeji, Japan, June 26, 2003.
51 See Reinhard Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in Introduction to German Law 28 (W. Ebke & Matthew Finkin eds. 1996); Ranieri, op. cit.
at 832 (“Das preußische Referendariatsmodell … prägt heute noch das deutsche
Justiz- und Rechtssystem.“)
50
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nations of how law applies to particular cases. To some extent,
they began this work already at the university.52 In short, they
learn to do what a judge has to do. And it is the mastery of the
techniques of applying law to facts (Relationstechnik) that defines
the judge.53 The role of the German judge is to determine facts, to
apply the law to those facts, and to state those conclusions in a
formal judgment.
I myself have informally taken part in the classroom portion of the Referendars’ training. I believe that the skills imparted in
the Relationstechnik and the training to be a judge are valuable for
all future jurists.
b.

Education of lawyers in the United States

In the United States the system of legal education was established to train lawyers for practice. All persons who wish to
become legal professionals, whether as lawyers or as judges or
otherwise, are trained as lawyers. The image of the lawyer as advocate colors the ideal of the legal professional
In the United States someone who wishes to become a lawyer
must successfully graduate from an undergraduate college with a
degree in almost any subject. Three years of law school study then
follow. In the United States the system of university legal education began as a private substitute for an existing informal private
system of apprenticeship training conducted by practicing lawyers. The apprenticeship system continued to exist alongside the
52 Fikentscher has explained it this way: in the university students learn the
“non-litigious opinion style” and in the internship period the “litigious opinion
style”. (Stil des unstreitigen Gutachtens and Stil des streitigen Gutachtens respectively). Interns learn to handle cases with varying sets of facts and subject to different
claims, objections, replications, etc. They put the many different relevant nonlitigious opinions into one litigious opinion from which they then extract a
judgment: “the judge renders a decision,’ a judgment, and this decision is the
litigious opinion turned upside down, namely, beginning with the outcome, continuing with the legal rules that support the claims, objections, rejoinders,, and
duplicas, and ending with the subsumption. This is presented claim by claim,
objection by objection, rejoinder by rejoinder, duplica by duplica, the whole
judgment being arranged by claims. By contrast, as has been said, the nonlitigious opinion starts with an open question: Could the plaintiff have this
claim?, continues with the subsumption, and ends with a ‘therefore.’”
53 Accord, Alfred Rinken, Einführung in das jurstische Studium 135 (1977).

16

No. 25, MAR. 2004, pages 63 et seq.
KANSAI UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF LAW AND POLITICS

university system for the entire nineteenth century and remained
at least a theoretical possibility for much of the twentieth.54 Although today no law office training is required, relatively few
students begin work independently as lawyers. More commonly
they begin their careers as junior lawyers in law firms (associates)
or otherwise as junior lawyers in larger organizations. The result
is that most American law students graduate from law school
with little practical training as lawyers and without certification as
specialists. Most get their practical training in on the job work.
The first year of law school is the pride-and-joy of American law schools. While the courses are usually the same, it is not
their substance that matters, but that students are taught to “think
like lawyers.”55 The American case method of legal instruction
trains students to identify a precise point in controversy and to
argue for resolving that controversy favorably. It teaches them
first to find the legal rule relevant to the instant controversy by
distilling it out of a mass of precedents, and then second, to argue
for a favorable resolution of that point.56 There is no need for the
student to make a legal decision let alone to place such a decision
in any kind of system outside of the context of the particular case.
54 See generally Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the
1850s to the 1980s (1983); Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law: Historical Development and Principal Contemporary Problems
of Legal Education in the United States, Carnegie Foundation Bulletin No. 15
(1921).
55 See Josef Redlich, The Common Law and the Case Method in American University Law Schools, A Report to the Carnegie Foundation, Bulletin No. 8, at 2425 (1914). Not all law students believe that they are being taught to think like
lawyers. See Alan Watson, Legal Education Reform: Modest Suggestions, 51 Journal
of Legal Education 91 (2001).
56 Redlich perceptively captured the essence of this method: “Under the old
method law is taught to the hearer dogmatically as a compendium of logically
connected principles and norms, imparted ready made as a unified body of established rules. Under [the case method] these rules are derived, step-by-step, by
the students themselves by a purely analytic process which forbids a priori acceptance of any doctrine or system either by the teacher or by the hearer. In the former method all law seems firmly established and is only to be grasped, understood and memorized by the pupils as it is systematically laid before them. In the
latter, on the other hand, everything is regarded as in a state of flux; on principle,
so to speak, everything is again to be brought into question.” Redlich, op. cit. at
13.
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Legal argument is the end in itself.57 The case method has been
subject to much criticism and now is rarely used in the same manner as originally.58
The case law system of instruction was first introduced in
1870. It largely displaced the lecture method previously in use in
law schools and vanquished law office study altogether. I believe
that it did this, not because it taught law office skills better or the
substantive law more systematically, but because it provided a
better preparation for bringing the law and facts together. In other
words, I think that it focused better on the kind of thinking that a
lawyer must do in daily practice without regard to the specific
type of practice that lawyer has.
6.

The challenge of the Justice System Reform Council

Beginning next year the system of legal education in Japan will change. Potential lawyers who have an undergraduate
education in legal studies will spend two years, while those with
an undergraduate education in another subject will spend three
years in professional studies at a law school. They will then take
an examination that will accept—as originally planned—some
70% to 80% of them, but in actuality possibly far fewer of them
into the Legal Training and Research Institute in Tokyo. The lucky
ones who are admitted will spend one year in practical studies
mostly detailed as apprentices to civil courts, criminal courts, administrative agencies and private law firms.

Richard Stith, Can Practice Do Without Theory? Differing Answers in Western
Legal Education, 80 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 426, 433 (1994).
(“An excellent student is one who can argue either side of a case with equal facility, who is trained to be a ‘hired gun’.”) This (as well as other aspects of the litigation system) helps explain two other features of American legal life. (1) The
party with the better lawyer should win. (2) Counseling clients is not so much
about whether particular action is within or outside law, but about who might
argue that the proposed action is improper and whether they would have a colorable claim.
58 For representative views of how the case method is currently used, see David
W. Leebron, The Philosophy of Legal Education, 19 Nihon University Comparative
Law 115, 121-22 (2002); Paul D. Reingold, Essay: Recent Trends in American Legal
Education, 15 Kwansei Gagkuin Law Review 17, 19-20 (2001).
57
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The Report of the Justice System Reform Council places
the law schools at the “core” of an “organically connected” system
of legal training.59 The Report finds in the present system a “gap
between education and actual legal practice.” It recommends that
legal education, national bar examination and apprenticeship
training all be connected as a “process.” The Report expects that
law schools, as the core of the new system, are to be “professional
schools providing education especially for training legal professionals …”60 They are to “build[] a bridge between theoretical
education and practical education.”61
The Report of the Justice System Reform Council in its direction that the length of time that aspiring lawyers spend at the
national Legal Training and Research Institute be reduced from
what was originally two years to one year, states the expectation
that law schools may pick up some of the instruction presently
provided at the Institute. In particular, the Report suggests that
law schools might cover what is now covered in the Institute’s
classroom type instruction in judgment drafting. It explicitly calls
for ongoing readjustment of allocation of initial classroom instruction in judgment technique between the Institute and the law
schools.62 One of the basic principles of the reform is that the apprenticeship training should be separately implemented.63

Justice System Reform Council, Chap. III, Part 2, 1.
Id.
61 Id. at Chap. III, Part 2, 2(1)b.
62 Id. at Chap. III, Part II, 4(1) (“How the burden of legal education should be
allocated between the group training (the first stage at the Legal Training and
Research Institute) within the apprenticeship training program provided following the new national bar examination and the educational programs provided at
law schools should continue to be readjusted as appropriate in the future as the
law schools system is being developed and taking root.”) Cf., id. at Chap. III, Part
2, 2(2)d (“Law schools should provide educational programs that, while centered
on legal theory that takes into account reasonable solutions to problems arising
in the world of practice, introduce practical education (e.g., basic skills concerning factual requirements or fact finding) with a strong awareness of the necessity
of building a bridge between legal education and legal theory on the basis of
systematic legal theory.”); Masato Ichikawa, Ritsumeikan University Proposal from
Kyoto Private School of Law and Politics to Ritsumeikan Kyoto Law School, 18 Ritsumeikan Law Review 23, 42 (2001).
63 Justice System Reform Council, op. cit., at Chap. III, Part 2, 2(1)c.
59
60
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The new bar examination may practically compel law
schools to take on this responsibility. According to the Report of
the Justice System Reform Council, the examination might become
one “for which a long period of time is provided, based on example cases composed of diversified and complex facts, without necessarily being bound by traditional subject categories …”64
So let me tell you what I would do, if I were you. Of
course, my thoughts here are unburdened by knowledge of Japan
or by having to live with the consequences. Still, allow me my
speculation, even if you are now smiling to yourselves and thinking, “what can he know?”
If I were starting a law school in Japan, I would welcome
taking on the responsibility of the Legal Training and Research
Institute for teaching how to apply the law to the facts of a particular case. I would seek to let that training pervade the instruction that I offered throughout my two-year program. I think it is
both an eminently teachable subject and one that students find
interesting.
In my Japanese law school I would take care, however, to
make sure that that training consider the application of the law
not only from the perspective of the judge, but also from the perspective of a lawyer who is advocating a decision favorable to his
or her client. While providing training in thinking like a lawyer, I
would try to avoid requiring every student to learn more than the
fundamentals of the substantive law and of basic skills. I would
not want to require that all students learn identical technical skills.
I would try to leave students free to shape their future legal careers. Law school cannot possibly give them all the knowledge
and skills that they will need At best law school can only prepare
them for a lifetime of learning.
I believe that good professional education in law should
also be good scientific education. I think that legal education is at
its best when its focus is on that which is enduring and general
rather than on that which is temporal and overly specific. What
endures are fundamentals of the substantive law, whether perspective, core or specialist knowledge, and above all, the key legal
skill of thinking like a lawyer. Of course, to think like a lawyer,
64

Justice System Reform Council, op. cit. at Chap. III, Part 2, 3(2).
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just as to practice any skill, requires substantive knowledge. A
lawyer must know the basics of the legal system.65 The basics
should be taught with attention to their historical and comparative law contexts. Armed with a basic knowledge of substantive
law—including perspective knowledge—and educated to “think
like lawyers,” graduates will be able to go out and learn new substantive law themselves. 66 Since they will practice for forty or
more years after they leave law school, law schools owe them
nothing less.
One potential objection to taking on instruction in judgment techniques is that law schools may be unable to provide
enough people able to teach judgment techniques and the legal
mind. I think that objection underestimates the knowledge and
skills that Japanese law faculties already have as well as their ability to gain new knowledge and skills. Japanese law faculties in
their present work are already quite familiar with applying norms
to facts. Even if they do not do so exactly as judges do, I think that
they can acquire such additional knowledge and skills as might be
required. Could they not arrange for the Legal Research and
Training Institute to include law school faculty members in present classroom training or even for the Institute to create a special
class for law faculty alone? If the Institute is unwilling, there are
alternatives. If German legal methods are as close to Japanese ones
as Japanese jurists have suggested to me, law faculty members
with good German-language skills could audit classes in Germany, much as I did twenty years ago. And, since such training in
Germany is decentralized, there are many potential study centers.
Even without going to Germany, there are numerous books that
Cf., Hans Peter Marutschke, Juristenausbildung un Japan—aus deutscher
Sicht, 18 Ritsumeikan Law Review, 87, 89 (2001) („Die in Japan jetzt vorrangig
gefuehrte Diskusssion um die Praxisorientierung der Juristenausbildung verkennt meines Erachtens, dass fuer eine gute praktische Anwendung des Rechts—
und das soll ja in erster Linie das Ziel der Juristenausbildung sein—ein sicheres
Verstaendnis der Grundlagen ... vorhanden ist.“)
66 Accord, Peter Gilles & Nikolaj Fischer, Juristenausbildung 2003—Zur neuesten
Ausbildungsreformdebatte in Deutschland, 20 Ritsumeikan Law Review 181, 200
(2003) (“dass das Leitbild fuer eine solche Juristenausbildung … zugrundeliegt,
das gebildete und flexible einarbeitungsfaehige Jurist sein soll, der weniger auf
Wissen in moeglichst vielen Rechtsgebieten, sondern auf grundsaetzliches methodisches Verstaendnis hin ausgebildet worden ist.”).
65
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offer instruction in German legal methods. Finally, if you law faculties remain hesitant, I would remind them that the system of
case law instruction that replaced law office training in the United
States deliberately utilized professors who did not have practice
experience.67
Time does not allow me to address another important issue that you surely already are considering: what will be the relationship between the new law schools and the existing law faculties?68 Will the new law schools drain the old law faculties of resources? What will happen to legal scholarship? Will law schools,
as they have in America, train practitioners with good skills in argumentation but little sense of system? That topic must await another day.
Goseicho arigatou gozaimasita
御清聴、有難うございました

Cf. Justice System Reform Council, op. cit., Chap. III, Part 2, 2(2)e (“As practitioner-teachers, not only those included in the legal profession within a narrow
sense, but also those who are otherwise qualified, should be broadly recruited.”)
68 Justice System Reform Council, op. cit. at Chap. III, Part 3, 2(1)c. (Universities
must “[c]learly define the relationship between education provided at law
schools and education provided at law faculties of universities.”)
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